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Resumo 
 
A Teoria da Dinâmica de Grupos Subjetiva (TDGS, e.g. Pinto, Marques, Levine & 
Abrams, 2010) sugere que os membros desviantes ameaçam os padrões normativos do seu 
grupo, e que a identidade positiva do grupo só pode ser restaurada através de reações 
negativas extremas dirigidas a esses desviantes. No entanto, o modelo de Crédito de 
transgressão (TC, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & 
Abrams, 2013) declara que tais reações negativas não se aplicam a líder desviantes do 
endogrupo, dado que os outros membros atribuem licença para desviar. Numa experiência 
(N = 75), prevemos e encontramos que o crédito de transgressão foi concedido apenas a 
líder que eram legítimos aos olhos dos participantes. Adicionalmente, encontramos que 
este efeito era ainda maior em situações, em que os mecanismos de controlo social formais 
eram ausentes. Em contraste, os participantes concordaram mais com ações de punição 
formal e ação coletiva punitiva em direção ao líder ilegítimo. Interessantemente, a ausência 
de mecanismos de controlo social formais predisseram a ação coletiva punitiva em direção 
ao líder desviante legítimo. 
 
(176 palavras) 
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Abstract 
 
Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT, e.g., I. R. Pinto, J. M. Marques, J. M. 
Levine & D. Abrams, 2010) suggests that deviant members threaten their group’s 
normative standards, and that the group’s positive identity can only be restored through 
extreme negative reactions directed to these deviants. However, the transgression credit 
model (TC, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & 
Abrams, 2013) states that such negative reactions do not apply to deviant ingroup leaders, 
as other members give them license to deviate. In one experiment (N = 75), we predicted 
and found that transgression credit was granted only to leaders who were legitimate in 
participants’ eyes. In addition, we also found that this effect was even greater in situations 
in which the group’s formal social control mechanisms were absent. In contrast, 
participants agreed more with formal punishment and punitive collective action towards 
the illegitimate leader. Interestingly, the absence of group’s formal social control 
mechanisms predicted punitive collective action towards the illegitimate deviant leader. 
 
(166 words) 
 
 
KEY WORDS: LEADER’S LEGITIMACY; SUBJECTIVE GROUP 
DYNAMICS; (IN)FORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL; TRANSGRESSION CREDIT; 
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Conceptual Framework 
 
The on-going Portuguese financial crisis that emerged in 2010 is a major political 
and socio-economic issue that stands for the most severe economic recession in Portugal 
since the 1970s. To most Portuguese people, the countries’ leaders across the last decades 
are to blame for this crisis and its effects on the economy and well-being of a large 
majority of citizens. Doubts are shed not only about the competence of our policy-makers, 
but also about their credibility and honesty. Just last year, hundreds of thousands of people 
have taken part in protests across Portugal demanding the government to resign 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21643853, March 2, 2013). 
In the present work we propose that motivation to engage in collective action 
against ingroup leaders may be due, not only to the leaders’ deviance itself, but especially 
to the widespread opinion that these leaders are incompetent, untrustworthy, that they 
disregard the group’s goals, and as such, should not be entitled to lead – i.e., leaders 
perceived as having no legitimacy to assume such a relevant role within the group. 
Although we might observe, in daily-life, that groups often punish or even remove their 
leaders because of their lack of competence, a fair amount of research shows that leaders 
can also be tolerated or even accepted despite their wrongful behaviour (Transgression 
Credit, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 
2013). We think that formal group acceptance of deviant leaders should lead to collective 
tolerance only when leaders are perceived as assuming legitimately group leadership. On 
the contrary, when deviant leaders are perceived to be illegitimate, they should be 
perceived as highly threatening to the group, and, consequently, should evoke extreme 
negative reactive emotions, and, therefore, motivation to engage in collective action. In this 
work, we propose an analysis of this process based on social identity theory, subjective 
group dynamics theory, and the transgression credit model.  
 
The Social Identification Approach 
In society, people tend to perceive and position themselves and others as members 
of groups or social categories with which they may or may not identify, towards which 
they may share a more or less positive or negative emotional involvement, and in terms of 
which they may try to achieve some degree of positive value to themselves and others as 
group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this vein, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; 
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Tajfel & Turner, 1979) defines social identity as the part of an individual’s self-concept 
that derives from their knowledge that they belong to a social group, together with these 
group’s potential contribution to the value assigned to the self, and the emotional 
consequences of that value. 
Social identity theory (SIT), postulates that people are motivated to hold a positive 
self-concept. Because the social categories in which people include themselves contribute 
to a positive or negative value to their self-concept, and because such value can only be 
established comparatively to other groups, people will develop strategies that allow their 
group to attain a comparatively superior position relative to other groups (Tajfel, 1978). 
That is, individuals identify themselves with certain groups (ingroups) and, as a result, are 
motivated to increase the value of these groups by differentiating them (and, hence, by 
differentiating themselves as group members) from relevant outgroups in particular 
contexts of social comparison. 
 
Group norms 
Group belongingness and identification with a group also implies knowledge and 
affiliation of some degree to the specific norms of the group. In social life, norms are 
important devices that allow individuals to guide their behaviour appropriately, knowing 
what to expect from others in different social contexts, and to proscribe inappropriate 
behaviour (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936; Brauer & Chaurand, 2010). Norms define social 
uniformities that emerge as a product of social interaction, and that guide individuals’ 
perceptions and judgments of the physical and social world (Hogg & Turner, 1987). 
 
Subjective group dynamics and reaction to deviance 
There is a strong link between compliance with ingroup normative positions and the 
very definition of the social self. Subjective group dynamics theory (SGDT, e.g., Marques 
& Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010) deals mostly with situations in 
which individuals face ingroup members who ostensibly violate important norms to the 
group, thus potentially jeopardizing other members’ positive social identity. SGDT 
postulates that deviance within groups threatens the normative standards of the group, 
being perceived as contributing negatively to the group’s positive value and, consequently, 
to the social identity of its members. Such a threat to the legitimacy of the ingroup’s 
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superior position relative to other groups, and hence to the self, generates motivation to 
exert social control over deviant members (Marques, Páez & Abrams, 1998).  
SGDT proposes that only through an extreme negative reaction towards deviant 
ingroup members, individuals are able to show their commitment  to the group, the group 
is able restore the validity of the violated norm, and, consequently, preserve their positive 
social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine & Abrams, 2010). Indeed, 
research within the SGDT has consistently shown evidence consistent with this idea: it has 
demonstrated that an extreme rejection of deviant ingroup members (as compared to 
similar outgroup members) seems to be linked to the violation of those norms that are 
relevant for the group’s attainment of a positive social identity and is a function of 
individuals’ degree of social identification (Branscombe, Wann, & Noel, 1994; Marques & 
Páez, 1994; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). More specifically, ingroup deviant 
members are more derogated when the group’s positive distinctiveness is uncertain 
because of the threat that deviant members cause to the validity of the ingroup normative 
positions (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). 
 
Transgression credit model 
In contrast with SGDT, the transgression credit model (TC, Abrams, Randsley de 
Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013) posits that these 
negative reactions do not apply to transgressive leaders. In comparison to outgroup leaders 
and to regular ingroup or outgroup members, people are less critical toward ingroup 
leaders when they transgress a relevant norm (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). 
According to this model, it appears that members use a “double standard” in judging 
ingroup deviant leaders that allows them to turn a “blind eye” to leaders’ deviant behaviour 
and assign these leaders license to deviate. The authors explain this leniency towards 
transgressive ingroup leaders on basis of members’ adherence to a norm of loyalty to the 
ingroup. According to these authors, punishment towards an ingroup leader may be 
perceived as an act of disloyalty per se. Indeed, and as Hogg (2001) proposed, leaders have 
great influence in the group because they are perceived as the most prototypical member. 
In other others, a prototypical leader is the member that fits the role best (in comparison to 
other ingroup members). Thus, usually, leaders are accepted by others as source of 
influence and models of guidance of group behaviour (Hogg, 2001). Because they occupy 
such a central role and are the best representatives of the ingroup, a negative reaction 
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towards leaders that misbehave may be perceived as a negative reaction towards the 
ingroup itself.  
Though, we believe that this assumption only makes sense if the leader is really 
considered as the best representative of the group, being acknowledged by the group to 
lead them. In this sense, our general proposition for this study is that only a leader that 
gathers legitimacy among group members can be given credit to transgress group norms, 
thus, the TC should only apply to deviant leaders acknowledged by the group. 
 
Legitimacy in leadership and idiosyncratic credit 
Followers bestow power and status on leaders, whom easily gather consensual 
prestige among regular group members (Hollander & Julian, 1969; Hogg, 2001). Thus, 
leadership role is reinforced by the commitment of other members to the group and to their 
leader. Hollander (2006) defines legitimacy as the attribute ascribed to group members that 
obtain a leader status based on followers’ validation and on the interaction they maintain 
with this member. According to this conception, a leader needs the group’s 
acknowledgment and validation of his/her leader status to be perceived as legitimate 
(Hollander, 2006, 2009). Julian, Hollander and Regula (1969) propose some attributes that 
contribute to such acknowledgment, such as perceived leader’s competence and leader’s 
task success (see also, Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998).  
According to the idiosyncrasy credit model (IC, e.g. Hollander, 1958, 2006, 2009) 
leaders obtain credit through behaviour benefiting the group that captivate positive 
perceptions among other group members. On the contrary, when the leader loses all 
previously awarded credits ascribed by the group, thus reaching a balance of zero, group 
members begin to engage in pressure strategies to remove him/ her from this status or even 
from the group (Hollander, 1958). Thus, legitimacy and credit bolster one another 
(Hollander, 2006, Hollander & Julian, 1970). Therefore, a leader’s legitimacy should 
reflect the credit that allows him/ her to deviate. 
  
Collective action and emotional climate 
SGDT has being focused on reaction to deviance as a strategic response 
implemented by individuals aimed to restore the violated norm, and consequently, the 
positive value of their social identity. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, group members 
may unite to deal with the deviant member, but collectively.  
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Collective actions are not only about rare revolutions, but also about everyday 
activism (van Zomeren, 2013). Collective action is considered as any action that 
individuals undertake as group members rather than individuals, thus implying some level 
of group identification (De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Van Stekelenburg & 
Klandermans, 2013). Indeed, in support of this reasoning, a great amount of research 
shows that high identifiers engage more in collective action (e.g. protest or petition) in 
defence of their group than low identifiers (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; 
Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 2002; van Zomeren, 2013), especially 
when the group is threatened or is at disadvantage (Reicher, 1996; van Zomeren, Spears, & 
Leach, 2008).  
Along with collective actions, emotions also contribute to a dynamic system of 
meaning that shapes ongoing commitment to a cause (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). 
Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007) refer to emotions (such as anger) as 
accelerators or amplifiers of group protests, as they translate intentional behaviour into 
action faster and louder. These emotions, when shared within the group, may then serve as 
fuel to collective action. Complementarily, and more directly relevant to psychosocial 
processes underlying reaction to deviance, there is some evidence that relates members’ 
feelings of shame regarding a deviant ingroup member and punitive reactions directed to 
this member (Chekroun, 2008).  
 
Social Control 
Social control refers to the mechanisms that social groups have in order to preserve 
their values (e.g., Gibbs, 1981). Thus, the presence of deviant members within the ingroup 
triggers social control mechanisms (reactive strategies) in order to restore the value of the 
violated norm, and consequently, to preserve group’s values (Marques, Abrams, Páez & 
Hogg, 2001). Reactive strategies may be formally implemented by groups, such as legal 
penalties prescribed to the deviant member (e.g., Becker, 1963), or informally 
implemented by other members, such as derogatory reactions, hostility (e.g., Levine, 
1989), or, importantly for our purposes, punitive collective action (e.g. De Weerd & 
Klandermans, 1999; Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez & de Weerd, 2002; van Zomeren, 
2013).  
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Present study 
If we integrate Hollander’s ideas regarding leader’s legitimacy (e.g. Hollander, 
2006, 2009) and idiosyncratic credit (Hollander, 1958) with the transgression credit model 
(Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013; Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013), 
we may think that individuals should only assign license to deviate to leaders that gather 
legitimacy among other group members. Indeed, legitimacy of a deviant leader should 
account for how group members perceive the deviant behaviour, so that a legitimate leader 
could be given idiosyncratic credit and, concomitantly, because they are highly 
representative of the ingroup (Hogg, 2001), it should contribute to vent a double standard 
in members’ judgments by giving the benefit of doubt for his/ her actions. 
Complementarily, SGDT research guidelines allow us to ponder that an illegitimate leader, 
thus who has never gathered idiosyncratic credit, in case of incurring in deviant behaviour, 
should be perceived as highly (doubling) threatening to the group’s positive value and, 
consequently, to the other members’ social identity. Indeed, illegitimate leaders that 
deviate from group normative standards should be perceived as being threatening not only 
because of the deviant behaviour they adopted, but also because they assume a role within 
the group that do not deserve. Hence, these members should not obtain a transgressive 
credit for their deviant behaviour. On the contrary, these members should trigger more 
negative emotions from other members and consequent strong negative reactions. We 
believe that, in the absence of a perceived proper implementation of formal social control 
mechanisms towards the illegitimate leaders, group members should be more prone to 
agree in engaging in punitive collective action towards these members, in order to protect 
the group, namely by demanding these leaders’ removal from the leader role.  
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Empirical Study 
 
 
1. Overview and Hypotheses 
 
We conducted an experiment aiming to test the above idea. Participants read a piece 
of newspaper depicting a Portuguese deviant leader from a PPP (Public-Private 
Partnership). According to experimental conditions, the leader was presented as being 
competent, trustworthy and credited by other group members (Legitimate condition) or as 
the exact opposite, as being incompetent, untrustworthy and not credited by group 
members (Illegitimate condition). Participants then gave their opinion about how 
threatening was the leader to the group, evaluated the target, and showed their agreement 
with the implementation of formal social control. Then, a second piece of the same 
newspaper informed participants about the social control measures that were undertaken by 
the group (Social Control): the deviant leader was going to be brought to trial and to be 
judged according to the law (Present condition) or the case would be filed/prescribed 
(Absent condition). Following this manipulation, participants gave their agreement with 
collective action, and reported their emotions about the deviant leader.   
We expected participants to evaluate more positively, to perceive as being less 
threatening to the group, to agree less with formal punishment measures to express a lower 
intensity of negative emotions and less agreement with punitive collective action in the 
Legitimate condition as compared to the Illegitimate condition. In sum, we should observe 
reactions consistent with the attribution of a transgressive credit towards the legitimate 
deviant leader, whereas we should observe extreme negative reactions towards the 
illegitimate deviant leader. 
Moreover, we expect Legitimacy to predict agreement with collective action 
mediated by perceived threat caused by the deviant leader, agreement with the 
implementation of formal social control and intense expression of negative emotions. 
Nonetheless, this multi-mediation model should be moderated by social control. More 
specifically, participants should agree more with collective action directed toward the 
illegitimate deviant leader, to the extent that they perceive this member to be threatening to 
the group’s image. Such perceived threat should predict participants’ agreement with 
formal punishment. Agreement with punitive formal reactions should predict agreement 
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with punitive collective action especially when no formal social control is exerted towards 
the leader. In the absence of formal social control measures directed towards an 
illegitimate deviant leader, negative emotions about the deviant member should emerge 
among participants, which, in turn, should lead them to commit to collective action 
(Mediation Hypothesis). 
 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1.Participants and Design.  
A sample of 32 male and 43 female Portuguese respondents (N = 75), aged from 17 
to 76 years old (M = 26.93, SD = 10.73) participated in this study. There were no 
significant differences in sex (χ23= 1.44, ns) or age (F3,71 = 2.14, ns) across experimental 
conditions. The experimental design was a 2 (Leader’s Legitimacy: Legitimate vs. 
Illegitimate) X 2 (Social Control: Present vs. Absent) between-participants factors. 
 
2.2.Procedure. 
Participants were informed they were taking part in a study about “Political 
behaviour in Portugal”, specifically about PPP’s (Public-Private Partnerships). A fictitious 
piece of newspaper from “National Health Journal” was presented about the president 
“António Sousa” of the PPP “Ministry of Health – Hospital of Loures”. In this piece, 
participants read that António Sousa adopted some deviant measures regarding his 
workers: “He ignores some safety measures to save time”; “He made some reductions in 
workers’ salaries in order to compensate the costs of the construction process of the 
hospital”1. 
                                                 
 
1
 The leader’s deviance induction was selected through a pilot study. Participants (N = 26) gave their 
opinion about how correct they thought that several attitudes that were supposedly implemented by leaders of 
projects related to PPP institutions were [1 = Completely wrong; 7 = Completely correct]. The following 
were the deviant attitudes that were considered for statistical analysis: (1) “To benefit friends/relatives since 
it does not significantly affect the project”; (2) “Occasionally, to give priority to customers that are “most 
interesting” in economic terms”; (3) “To pay extra monetary amounts aiming to speed up measures regarding 
the project”; (4) "To, ignore some minor security measures in order to save time ", (5) "To not give great 
importance to the opinions of those colleagues that do not have the necessary knowledge about relevant 
issues;" (8) " To assign jobs to friends / relatives in order to accelerate the process of recruiting staff, 
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2.3.Leader’s Legitimacy Manipulation. 
In the Legitimate condition, participants learned that the leader’s partners stated 
that “António Sousa was always successful in the projects he participated in” and that “We 
believe that this partnership will be successful”. Moreover, participants also read some 
opinions from his workers: “From the beginning he has showing good skills as a manager 
(…)” and “I heard that as a manager he never had any problem in concluding previous 
projects, (…) this relieves us, especially because he occupies the most leading role in the 
project (President)”. In the Illegitimate condition, partners claimed that “António Sousa 
was not always successful in the projects he participated in” and that “We fear that this 
partnership might fail”. Moreover, the workers’ opinions were: “Since the beginning we 
have constant doubts about his skills as a manager (…)” and “I heard that this isn’t the first 
time he has problems in concluding projects, (…) this worries us, especially because he 
occupies the leading role in the project (President)”. 
 
2.4.Social Control Manipulation. 
A second piece of the same newspaper stated that the deviant leader “was under 
investigation [was denounced] by the Attorney-General due to inconsistencies from 
"administrative decisions" recently adopted by the President [leader], speculating as a 
misuse of public funds”. In the Present condition, the piece referred that “this case is in 
trial, and António Sousa will be judged according to law”, while in the Absent condition, 
the piece referred that “the Attorney General will dismiss the case, thus it will not be 
brought to court”. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
providing they have the required skills", (9)" To reduce workers’ salaries to obtain more money to spend in 
the project "; (10) "To ignore bureaucracy in some urgent cases”. Results showed statements 4 (M = 2.15, DP 
= 1.46) and 9 (M = 2.42, DP = 1.27) were the most negatively evaluated, thus, composing the deviance 
induction for the experiment. 
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3. Measures 
 
3.1.Social identification. 
Social Identification was measured by the following items (1 = Disagree; 7 = 
Agree): (1) “Being Portuguese is important to define who I am"; (2) “I share the costumes, 
tastes and opinions of the majority of Portuguese population"; (3) “I am glad to have been 
born in Portugal"; (4) “I am proud to be Portuguese". We averaged the answers to these 
items to a Social identification score (Cronbach’s α = .60)2. 
 
3.2.Perceived Legitimacy. 
After the manipulation of Leader’s Legitimacy, participants’ perception about the 
leader was measured in three items (1 = Untrustworthy, Incompetent, Unreliable; 7 = 
Trustworthy, Competent, Reliable). We averaged the answers to these items to a Perceived 
Legitimacy score (Cronbach’s α = .92). 
 
3.3.Threat to the group. 
Participants gave their opinion about the threatening character of the deviant leader 
to the group, in three items (1 = I completely disagree, 7 = I completely agree): (1) “This 
individual jeopardizes the country"; (2) “This individual threatens Portugal’s image"; (3) 
“The content of this news undermines my confidence in the Portugal’s political system". 
We averaged these items to a Threat to the Group score (Cronbach’s α = .86). 
 
3.4.Target’s evaluation. 
Participants evaluated the target in four bipolar traits: (1 = Negative, Dishonest, 
Unfair and Disrespectful; 7 = Positive, Honest, Fair and Respectful). We averaged these 
items into a Target’s Evaluation score (Cronbach’s α = .91). 
 
                                                 
 
2
 Item 2 was removed to increase internal consistency (with item 2, Cronbach’s α = .55). 
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3.5.Formal Punishment. 
Participants gave their agreement on several possible formal punishment reactions 
regarding the target (1 = I completely disagree, 7 = I completely agree): (1) "António 
Sousa should maintain his President role in the project"; (2) "We should wait for the real 
impact of his implemented policies"; (3) “António Sousa should justify his decisions in a 
public report" and (4) "António Sousa should work under supervision”; (5) "António Sousa 
should be demoted and become an integrated member without exerting management 
decisions"; (6) "António Sousa should be fired and replaced by someone more competent"; 
(7) "Authorities should open a judicial inquiry regarding Antonio Sousa". A Principal 
Components Factorial Analysis with Varimax rotation showed that the seven items 
saturated in 2 main factors: factor 1
3, denominated as “Punishment” (Cronbach’s α = .87), 
and explains 47.3% of variance; factor 2, as “Control” (Cronbach’s α = .72), explaining 
23.8% of variance of the results (see Table 1). 
 
3.6.Perceived Social Control. 
After the manipulation of Social Control, participants answered to three items 
aiming to check the effectiveness of Social Control manipulation (1 = I completely 
disagree; 7 = I completely agree): (1) “I believe in the efficacy of the Attorney General to 
deal with this case”; (2) “This kind of decisions prevent similar problems in future 
situations"; (3) “The course of action taken by the Attorney General is sufficient to solve 
this problem". We averaged the answers to these items to a Perceived Social Control score 
(Cronbach’s α = .77). 
 
3.7.Collective action. 
After the Social Control manipulation, participants indicated their agreement (1 = I 
completely disagree; 7 = I completely agree) with three items measuring punitive 
collective action regarding the case they read about: (1) "A public manifestation/rally 
should be carried to defend a higher integrity of PPPs’ "; (2) "People should stand for the 
end of this type of Partnerships"; (3) "People should participate in a petition aiming to 
                                                 
 
3
 Items 1 and 2 were recoded, due to negatively saturating with items 5, 6 and 7. Given that items 3 
and 4 did not saturate with the main factor, they were not used in this study. 
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remove Antonio Sousa from the Partnership". We averaged these answers to a Collective 
Action score (Cronbach’s α = .70). 
 
3.7.1. Negative emotions. 
Finally, participants indicated  which emotions were triggered by the deviant leader 
(1 = None; 7 = A lot of): “shame"; "embarrassment"; "disappointment"; "discouragement"; 
"revolt"; "anger". We averaged these items to a Negative Emotions score
4
 (Cronbach’s α = 
.94) (see Table 2). 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Control measures 
We will begin by presenting the analyses regarding control measures, because these 
are less relevant regarding our hypotheses, but are fundamental to assure equality of 
identification across experimental conditions, and the efficacy of experimental 
manipulations. 
 
4.1.Social identification. 
A Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Social Identification score 
shows that participants highly identified with the ingroup (M = 5.90, SD = 0.94) and 
similarly between conditions, all Fs(1, 71) ≤ 2.43, ns. 
 
4.2.Perceived Legitimacy. 
Because participants responded to Perceived Legitimacy items before being 
presented with Social Control manipulation, we expected to find differences in this 
measure only regarding Leader’s Legitimacy conditions. A Leader’s Legitimacy X Social 
Control Anova on the Perceived Legitimacy score showed that participants perceived 
                                                 
 
4
 Items “uncertainty" and "insecurity” were removed. A post-hoc careful inspection about these 
items leads us to think that they do not refer to negative and reactive emotions. Indeed, these might be 
emotions about the ingroup, but do not have the negative character of the others.  
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greater legitimacy in the Legitimate condition (M = 4.83, SD = 0.68) than in the 
Illegitimate condition (M = 2.41, SD = 1.03), F(1, 71) = 139.17, p < .001, η2 = .622. Thus, 
Leader’s Legitimacy manipulation was effective. As expected, we found no effect of 
Social Control, F(1, 71) < 1, ns. We did found a Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control 
marginal interaction F(1, 71) = 3.44, p = .068, however this is not an issue, since there was 
no significant differences between Social Control in the Legitimate condition t(30) = 1.50, 
ns, or in the Illegitimate condition t(41) = -1.38, ns. 
 
4.3.Perceived Social Control. 
A Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Perceived Social Control 
showed that participants perceived a higher level of formal punishment directed to the 
deviant leader in the Present condition (M = 4.69, SD = 0.84) as compared to the Absent 
condition (M = 3.06, SD = 1.33), F(1, 71) = 37.76, p < .001, η2 = .34. Thus, Social control 
manipulation was effective. Moreover, we found a significant marginal effect of Leader’s 
Legitimacy, F(1, 71) = 3.02, p = .086 and significant Leader’s Legitimacy X Social 
Control interaction F(1, 71) = 10.27, p = .002, η2 = .13. Even though there were no 
significant differences between Leader’s Legitimacy in the Present condition t(31) = -1.25, 
ns, in the Absent condition, participants perceived less social control, when the leader was 
Illegitimate (M = 2.56; DP = 1.06) than when he was Legitimate (M = 3.78; DP = 1.38) 
t(40) = 3.25, p = .002. This outcome may accrue from the Leader’s Legitimacy 
manipulation, in the sense that participants perceived the absence of social control on an 
illegitimate leader as less efficient, because they might believe that he should have been 
punished. Therefore, these results only further support our hypothesis that Leader’s 
Legitimacy has a strong influence on reaction to deviance. 
 
Dependent measures 
 
4.4.Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment. 
We expected participants to perceive higher threat from and to agree more with 
formal punishment towards the illegitimate deviant leader than the legitimate deviant 
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leader
5
. We conducted a Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control Manova on the Threat to 
the Group and Formal Punishment scores. This analysis showed a significant effect of 
Leader’s Legitimacy (Wilks’ λ = .705; F2,70 = 14.61, p < .001, η2 = .295). For Social 
Control effect and Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control interaction, Wilks’ λ ≥ .960; 
F(2,70) ≤ 1.46, ns. Regarding Threat to the Group, the effect of Leader’s Legitimacy 
showed that participants perceived the deviant leader as more threatening in the 
Illegitimate condition (M = 5.19, SD = 1.31) than in the Legitimate condition (M = 4.29, 
SD = 1.45), F(1, 71) = 8.84, p = .004, η2 = .11. Regarding the Formal Punishment score, 
the effect of Leader’s Legitimacy showed that participants agreed more that the illegitimate 
deviant leader should be punished (M = 4.87, SD = 1.29) than the legitimate deviant leader 
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.19), F(1, 71) = 29.67, p < .001, η2 = .30. These results support our 
hypothesis, as the illegitimate deviant leader is perceived as more threatening and triggers 
more agreement with punitive reactions towards him than the legitimate deviant leader. 
 
4.5.Target’s Evaluation. 
In the same line of the previous measures, we also expected participants to evaluate 
more negatively an illegitimate than a legitimate deviant leader. A Leader’s Legitimacy X 
Social Control Anova on the Target’s Evaluation score showed only a significant effect of 
Leaders Legitimacy, indicating that participants evaluated less negatively the deviant 
leader in the Legitimate condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.09) than in the Illegitimate condition 
(M = 2.66, SD = .93), F(1, 71) = 31.88, p < .001, η2 = .31.  As expected, we found no 
effect of Social Control, F(1, 71) ≤ .66, ns or Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control 
interaction F(1, 71) ≤ .02, ns. These results are consistent with our hypothesis according to 
which the transgressive credit should be ascribed to the legitimate leader and not to the 
illegitimate deviant leader. 
 
4.6.Collective action. 
A Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control Anova on the Collective Action was 
conducted in order to test the idea that participants should agree more with punitive 
                                                 
 
5
 We should not expect any effect of Social Control nor significant Leader’s Legitimacy X Social 
Control because Threat and Formal Punishment were measured before the Social Control manipulation. 
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collective action towards the illegitimate deviant leader than the legitimate deviant leader, 
especially when no formal social control is exerted upon the deviant leader. The analysis 
yielded a significant effect of Leader’s Legitimacy, F(1,71) = 3.79, p = .056, η2 = .051, but 
no significant effect of Social Control, F(1,71) < 1, ns nor Leader’s Legitimacy X Social 
Control interaction F(1, 71) < 1, ns. These results indicate that participants agreed more 
with collective punishment in the Illegitimate condition (M = 5.06, SD = 1.29), than in the 
Legitimate condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.43). However, because we did not observe any 
effect of social control in this score (either main effect or through a significant interaction 
with Leader’s Legitimacy), we may say that results only partially support our hypotheses. 
 
4.7.Negative emotions. 
A Leader’s Legitimacy X Social Control Anova computed on the Negative 
Emotions score yielded significant effects of Leader’s Legitimacy (F1,71 = 4.69, p = .034, 
η2 = .062) and Social Control (F1,71 = 4.75, p = .033, η2 = .063), but no significant 
interaction between both factors (F1,71 < 1). Participants significantly felt negative 
emotions with greater intensity when the deviant leader was illegitimate (M = 5.15; SD = 
1.37) than when he was legitimate (M = 4.41; SD = 1.68). The significant Social Control 
effect shows, in turn, that participants felt more negative emotions in the Present (of formal 
Social Control) condition (M = 5.22; SD = 1.32) than in the Absent condition (M = 4.53; 
SD = 1.66). Because we did not obtain the predicted significant interaction, but based on 
the obtained two main effects, we decided to further inspect how Negative Emotions 
differentiate between experimental conditions, through independent t-tests. Results show 
significant differences between the Legitimate-Absent condition (M = 3.94; SD = 1.56) and 
the other conditions, specifically with Legitimate-Present condition (M = 4.94; SD = 1.71, 
p = .059), the Illegitimate-Present condition (M = 5.45; SD = .87, p = .004), and the 
Illegitimate-Absent condition (M = 4.94; SD = 1.63, p = .035; remaining comparisons: p 
always ns). This evidence shows that the TC only applies when the group acknowledges 
the deviant leader as legitimate, and especially when participants perceive that the group 
does not direct any formal punishment to him. 
 
4.8.Mediated-Moderation Hypothesis 
We predicted that Leader’s Legitimacy should affect Collective Action through 
Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment. Furthermore, we proposed that agreement 
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with formal punishment should predict collective action through Negative Emotions, but 
only in the Absent (Social Control) condition. To test this hypothesis, we conducted two 
separated analyses. We started to conduct a multi-mediated analysis attempted to test the 
mediation impact of Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment on the association 
between Leader’s Legitimacy and Collective Action. The second analysis aims to clarify 
the mediating impact of Negative Emotions on the association between Formal Punishment 
and Collective Action, unconditionally moderated by Social Control. 
 
4.9.Mediation model. 
For the first analysis, we tested the idea that Leader’s Legitimacy predicts Threat to 
the Group, which predicts Formal Punishment, which in turn predicts Collective Action. 
Thus, we expected a multi-mediation model, in which Leader’s Legitimacy should be the 
predictor (Legitimate = 1 and Illegitimate = 2), Collective Action as the dependent 
measure, and Threat to the Group and Formal Punishment as the mediators of the 
relationship between Leader’s Legitimacy and Collective Action.  
The Pearson’s product-moment correlations between the measures that compose the 
mediation component of our model were all significant (r ≥ .222, p ≤ .055). This 
correlational pattern allows us to proceed to a multi-mediation analysis using Hayes’ 
(2013) PROCESS analysis (Model 6; see Figure 1) to test our prediction. 
This model accounted for 39% of the variance. The total model explained 
significantly Collective Action, F (3, 71) = 14.83, p = < .001. In line with our prediction, 
as expected, the significant bivariate effect of Leader’s Legitimacy on Collective Action (b 
= .61, SE = .32, t = 1.95, p = .055) became non-significant when we entered Threat to the 
Group and Formal Punishment in the equation (b = -.25, SE = .30, t = -.84, ns). Thus, the 
model fully accounts for the predicted mediation of Threat to the Group and Formal 
Punishment between Leader’s Legitimacy and Collective Action (Threat to the Group: 
Sobel’s Z = 1.79, p = .073; Formal Punishment: Sobel’s Z = 2.64, p = .008). These results 
fully support our predictions: participants that perceived the deviant leader to be 
illegitimate, agreed more with collective action. Moreover, such agreement was predicted 
by the perception that these illegitimate deviant leaders were threatening to the group and 
by participants’ agreement with formal reaction towards the leader.  
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4.10. Moderating effect of Social Control. 
To further inspect the relationship between Formal Punishment and Collective 
Action, we conducted a mediation analysis, in which we considered Formal Punishment as 
the predictor, Collective Action as the dependent measure, and Negative Emotions as the 
mediator of the relationship between Formal Punishment and Collective Action. We 
predicted that the above mediation process would be stronger especially in the Absent 
(Social Control) condition, thus, Social Control should moderate the relationship between 
Formal Punishment and Negative Emotions. We conducted a PROCESS analysis (Hayes, 
2013; Model 7) in order to directly inspect the complete moderated-Mediation model (see 
figure X). 
This model accounted for 27X% of the variance. The complete model significantly 
predicts Collective Action, F (3, 71) = 8.67, p < .001. In line with our prediction, as 
expected, the direct effect of Formal Punishment on Collective Action (b = .34, SE = .09, t 
= 3.91, p < .001) became non-significant when we entered Negative Emotions as a 
mediator (b = -.21, SE = .35, t = -.58, ns). Importantly, the joint effect of Punishment and 
Social Control on Negative Emotions was marginally significant (b =.41, SE = .21, t = 
1.90, p = .061, 95CI = -.02 to .83). 
6
. The effect of Social Control on Negative Emotions 
was strong in the Absent condition (b = .28) than in the Present condition (b = .09). Thus, 
participants that agreed with formal punishment towards the deviant leader tended to agree 
with collective action to the extent that they felt intensive negative emotions. However, 
such negative reactions were intensified when participants faced an absence of social 
control.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Consistent with our predictions, perceived leader’s legitimacy predicted members’ 
reaction towards the deviant leader. Results showed that a legitimate leader that endorsed 
deviant actions generated less perceived threat, was more positively evaluated and more 
                                                 
 
6
 Punishment (b = -.20, SE = .35, t < 1, ns); Social Control (b = -2.34, SE = .96, t = -2.44, p = .017). 
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tolerated by the group in comparison to an illegitimate deviant leader. That is, individuals 
ascribed more transgressive credit to the legitimate than to the illegitimate deviant leader. 
Regarding the presence or absence of group social control on negative emotions triggered 
by the deviant leader and agreement with punitive collective action, results partially 
support our predictions. An inspection on the means showed that participants manifested 
lower negative emotions when they observed a legitimate deviant leader and, 
simultaneously, the absence of social control mechanisms implemented by the group. Such 
mitigation of negative emotions in this condition is consistent with the transgressive credit 
model assumptions. However, it seems that when individuals perceive the group to 
implement social control mechanisms towards a legitimate deviant leader, the transgressive 
credit does no longer prevail. Indeed, when individuals perceive the group to implement 
social control mechanisms toward a deviant leader, they manifest intense negative 
emotions and become to agree more with punitive collective action towards this leader. In 
brief, it seems that the double standard predicted by TC gives place to loyalty towards the 
group normative standards (provided by those social control mechanisms) when 
individuals know the guidelines of group reactions: the knowledge that the group does not 
implement social control mechanisms leads individuals to follow this pattern of 
condescendence for leaders misbehaviour, whereas the presence of social control 
mechanisms guide individuals’ judgments and trigger reactions consistent with derogatory 
strategies. 
Regarding the illegitimate deviant leader, results fully support our predictions. This 
leader not only was perceived as more threatening to the group, but also triggered more 
derogatory reactions. Interestingly, regardless of the presence or absence of the 
implementations of social control mechanisms, individuals showed high intensity of 
negative emotions and strong willingness to engage in punitive collective action. 
Interestingly, though, for our predictions, results also suggest that individuals were more 
prone to materialize their agreement with formal social control to punitive collective action 
when they perceive that the group did not direct social control mechanisms towards the 
illegitimate deviant leader. 
The present findings respond to some of the questions raised. It seems that the 
double standard applied to legitimate leaders may help group members to legitimize the 
leader’s actions as normative. Conceivably, a legitimate leader deserves, at least, the 
benefit of doubt. In this sense, his actions may be justified, as deviance is sometimes 
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necessary for the benefit of the group. Therefore, the group allows the deviant leader to 
continue his actions, as they may accept them as necessary. Moreover, the absence of 
formal social control, may even lead participants to support the leader’s actions, as they 
stop perceiving them as deviant. In contrast, the fact that participants felt strong negative 
emotions when the legitimate deviant leader was already formally punished, but did not 
engage in collective action must mean that some level of transgression credit was also 
present. 
A final idea comes to mind. Illegitimate leaders are people that the group does not 
acknowledge as leaders, which means that the leader may formally have leader status, but 
no actual influence with the group. If the leader is not perceived as a leader, then he is 
perceived as a regular member, and as such is considered an ingroup deviant member. 
Thus, consistently with subjective group dynamics theory, participants will extremely 
derogate and punish the deviant leader, now considered as a “black sheep”. 
In summary, leader’s legitimacy is essential to take into account regarding reaction 
to deviant leaders. Legitimate leaders are given more credit to deviate from group’s norms, 
in a sense that group acknowledgement acts as support to the leader’s action. Only when 
the deviant leader is perceived as legitimate and the group does not react, it seems that the 
group is in a “normalization” process of this member behaviour: group members really 
“forgive” and even accept the deviant leader. On the contrary, an illegitimate leader 
triggers negative emotions and agreement with punitive collective action (specifically in an 
attempt to remove this member from the leader role), regardless of any social control 
mechanisms.  
A possible critic lies in the similarity between credit in Hollander’s Idiosyncrasy 
credit model (1958), and legitimacy as we present it. Credit is defined through a balance of 
normative vs deviant actions (Hollander, 1958). However, in our study, leader’s legitimacy 
is presented through validation provided by close workers and partners that provide an 
overview of the leader’s background, such as his past competency, credibility, among other 
aspects. Hollander (2006, p. 299) stated that: “Legitimacy is seen as a fundamental factor, 
such as in granting trust to a leader. Credit is another, more psychological, way of 
considering the leader–follower bond, in regard to positively disposed perceptions”. 
Furthermore, “influence and power flow both from legitimacy and those additional 
elements affected by followers through their perceptions, attributions, and judgments” 
(Hollander, 2006, p. 299). Therefore, legitimacy seems to reflect how leaders operate in 
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relatively non-coercive situations in which power is dependent on the context and related 
persons. Moreover, while credit allows that it becomes possible that previous signs of 
conformity with the group’s norms allow later nonconformity to be better tolerated 
(Hollander, 1958), in our study, the leader never conformed to the group’s norms as he was 
presented as a deviant in both conditions. Despite this, we found the significant differences 
depending on leader’s Legitimacy. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The present study sheds some light into the increasing emergence of social 
movements in Portugal. The present study showed that a scenario where illegitimate 
deviant leaders are not punished raises an emotional negative climate among group 
members that leads them to engage in collective action. Indeed, the Portuguese people are 
filled with social frustration towards our leaders, often seen through popular “lynching” 
and demands such as collective requests for resignation of leaders. The current 
socioeconomic crisis weighs heavily on the people, and Portugal’s leaders appear to be 
failing in restoring order to the country and serving the people’s best interests. Such failure 
may deem leaders as illegitimate, for not being competent or motivated enough, losing 
credibility among the people, thus leaving them with a strong need of justice upon the 
leaders. Since formal social control to be exerted upon these deviant illegitimate leaders 
remains to be seen, people feel they have to see justice by their own hands, and thus, to go 
out on the streets and claim a new change, through the resign of current leaders. A leader’s 
formal status is not the only thing that defines his power, as leadership means nothing 
without group acknowledgement. 
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Appendix A 
Questionnaire presented to participants – varies according to conditions (see Method) 
Comportamento político em Portugal 
 
   
Nacionalidade_______________________ Idade: _____  Vota (Sim/Não): ______ 
  
No âmbito do Mestrado em Psicologia Social, está a ser realizado um estudo com o 
objetivo de compreender as opiniões que os portugueses têm acerca da existência de PPP’s 
(Parcerias Público-Privadas) e na forma como o dinheiro público é gerido.  
Este questionário tem a duração média de cinco minutos. Não existem respostas 
erradas. Os dados serão anónimos e confidenciais, destinando-se apenas para fins de 
investigação.  
Agradecemos desde já a sua participação. 
 
Indique o seu grau de acordo ou desacordo com cada uma das seguintes afirmações: 
 
1. 1. Ser português é importante para definir quem eu sou. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
2. 2. Partilho os hábitos, os gostos e as opiniões da maioria dos portugueses. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
3. 3. Fico contente por ter nascido em Portugal. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
4. 4. Sinto orgulho em ser português. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
PPP na Saúde: uma fatura sempre a aumentar 
 As parcerias público-privadas (PPP) consistem em contratos assinados entre uma 
entidade pública - administração central ou empresa pública – e uma entidade privada, para 
a construção de uma obra de interesse público. As PPP’s têm como objetivo a construção 
de infraestruturas importantes para a população, sem a obrigação do Estado para acarretar 
todos os custos da sua construção. No entanto, estas parcerias têm contribuído para o 
agravamento da dívida pública, nomeadamente por os contratos serem mais benéficos para 
as entidades privadas do que para o Estado.  
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Por favor, leia a notícia que se segue sobre António Sousa, Presidente da PPP 
Ministério da Saúde – Hospital de Loures. O objetivo desta parceria é a construção de um 
novo hospital em Loures que irá abranger o distrito de Lisboa e com implicações no 
sistema de saúde para todo o país. 
“Uma PPP em (des)envolvimento” 
António Sousa é o atual Presidente responsável pelo projeto “Mais Saúde para Todos” entre a 
Parceria Ministério da Saúde – Hospital de Loures. (…). 
As opiniões que recolhemos junto dos trabalhadores e sócios desta Parceria sobre António Sousa 
não são favoráveis ao Presidente. Segundo os sócios, “António Sousa nem sempre foi bem-
sucedido nos projetos em que participou” e “Temos receio que esta parceria fracasse”.  
No mesmo acordo, os trabalhadores comentaram que “Desde o início que temos dúvidas constantes 
das suas capacidades como gestor (…) ”; “Ouvi dizer que não é a primeira vez que se levanta 
dúvidas sobre a conclusão em projetos anteriores, (…) isto deixa-nos preocupados, especialmente 
quando ocupa o cargo mais importante do projeto (Presidente) ”. 
A verdade é que algumas das medidas tomadas até agora pelo Presidente levantam algumas 
suspeitas, nomeadamente, a forma como ignora algumas medidas de segurança dos 
trabalhadores para poupar tempo, que considera “pouco importantes”, ou a recente proposta de 
redução do salário dos trabalhadores do projeto com o objetivo de compensar a derrapagem 
orçamental agregada à construção do hospital (…). 
(Jornal Nacional da Saúde, 17/07/13 
Tendo em conta o historial apresentado e as opiniões dos trabalhadores, 
indique qual a sua perceção sobre a liderança de António Sousa para o projeto em 
causa: 
 
               
Não Confiável 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Confiável 
               
               
Incapaz/Ineficaz 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Eficaz/Capaz 
               
               
Não Credível 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Credível 
               
Em que medida acredita que: 
 
1. 1. Este indivíduo prejudica o país. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
2. 2. Este tipo de situações ameaça a imagem do nosso país. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
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1. 3. Esta notícia enfraquece a minha confiança no sistema político de Portugal. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
Tendo em conta as medidas tomadas pelo Presidente António Sousa que opinião tem 
acerca dele: 
               
Extremamente       
Negativa 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremamente      
Positiva 
Extremamente     
Desonesto 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremamente    
Honesto 
Extremamente               
Injusto 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremamente     
Justo 
Extremamente     
Desrespeitador 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Extremamente    
Respeitador 
               
 
Em que medida concorda que se deveria implementar as seguintes ações sobre A. 
Sousa? 
1) Permitir que António Sousa mantenha o cargo 
como Presidente do projeto. 
D
isco
rd
o
 to
talm
en
te 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C
o
n
co
rd
o
 to
talm
en
te
 
2) Dar mais tempo para verificar o real impacto da 
implementação das políticas implementadas pelo 
Presidente. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3) Obrigar António Sousa a justificar as suas 
tomadas de decisões em relatório público. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4) Exigir que António Sousa trabalhe sob 
supervisão, de forma a controlar as decisões 
importantes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5) Despromover António Sousa, mantendo-o como 
membro integrado na parceria, mas sem exercer 
cargos de chefia. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6) António Sousa deverá ser despedido e 
substituído por alguém mais competente. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7) As autoridades competentes deverão abrir um 
processo criminal contra António Sousa. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A seguinte notícia refere-se a um caso sobre o Presidente António Sousa, que está a ser 
investigado pela Procuradoria-Geral. 
Presidente de PPP investigado pelo Ministério Público 
O atual Presidente do projeto “Mais Saúde para Todos” está a ser investigado pela 
Procuradoria-Geral devido às inconsistências que advêm das “decisões administrativas” 
tomadas recentemente pelo Presidente, especulando-se como desvio de fundos públicos. 
Segundo o Procurador-Geral, “este caso está em tribunal, e António Sousa será julgado 
de acordo com a lei.”           Filipa Gonçalves, JNS, 
28/08/13 
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Como avalia a ação da Procuradoria-Geral relativamente a este caso? 
 
1. 1. Acredito na eficácia da Procuradoria-Geral para lidar com este caso. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
2. 2. Este tipo de decisões irá prevenir situações problemáticas semelhantes no futuro.  
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
3. 3. A ação realizada pela Procuradoria-Geral é suficiente para resolver este problema.  
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
Se estivesse no lugar dos sócios/trabalhadores desta PPP, o que estaria disposto a 
fazer? 
 
5. 1. Uma manifestação pública a defender maior integridade nas PPP’s. 
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
6. 2. Acabar/encerrar este género de Parcerias.  
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
7. 3. Fazer um abaixo-assinado a exigir que António Sousa seja removido da Parceria.  
Discordo totalmente 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Concordo totalmente  
               
 
 
Pensando neste tipo de decisões pelos atuais responsáveis de cargos de 
responsabilidade de topo em Portugal, em que medida sente: 
 
               
Nenhuma vergonha 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita vergonha 
Nenhum embaraço 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muito embaraço 
Nenhuma desilusão 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita desilusão 
Nenhum desânimo 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muito desânimo 
Nenhuma revolta 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita revolta 
Nenhuma raiva 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita raiva 
Nenhuma incerteza 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita incerteza 
Nenhuma insegurança 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Muita insegurança 
               
 
 
Obrigado pela colaboração! 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1. Formal Punishment: Item Factor Scores after Varimax. 
Table 2. Negative Emotions: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation. 
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Threat to the Group, Target’s 
Evaluation and Formal Punishment. 
Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Collective Action and Negative 
Emotions. 
Table 5. Pearson Correlation’s Tests for Measures. 
Figure 1.Mediated-Moderation model with standardized coefficients. 
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 Table 1. Formal Punishment: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation 
 
     Factor 1 Factor 2 
     
Formal Punishment Punishment Control 
(1) António Sousa should maintain his President 
role in the project 
.890 .045 
(2) We should wait for the real impact of his 
implemented policies 
.818 -.120 
(3) António Sousa should justify his decisions in 
a public report 
.056 .872 
(4) António Sousa should work under supervision .136 .869 
(5) António Sousa should be demoted and 
become an integrated member without exerting 
management decisions 
.707 .146 
(6) António Sousa should be fired and replaced 
by someone more competent 
.859 .176 
(7) Authorities should open a judicial inquiry 
regarding Antonio Sousa  
.769 .285 
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Table 2. Negative Emotions: Item Factor Scores after Varimax Rotation. 
 
     Factor 1 
     
Negative Emotions Negative Emotions 
Shame .940 
Embarrassment .860 
Disappointment .856 
Discouragement .886 
Revolt .899 
Anger .834 
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Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations of Threat to the Group, Target’s 
Evaluation and Formal Punishment.       
  
Legitimate Illegitimate 
    Present Absent Present Absent 
    M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Threat to the Group 4.47 1.72 4.14 1.20 5.63 .97 4.87 1.44 
Target’s Evaluation 3.90 1.35 4.06 .84 2.53 1.09 2.75 .80 
Formal Punishment 3.27 1.06 3.46 1.29 5.29 .99 4.57 1.41 
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Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations of Collective Action and Negative 
Emotions.         
  
Legitimate Illegitimate 
    Present Absent Present Absent 
    M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Collective Action 4.64 1.68 4.28 1.19 5.20 .94 4.96 1.50 
Negative Emotions 4.94 1.71 3.94 1.56 5.45 .87 4.94 1.63 
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Table 5. Pearson Correlation’s Tests for Measures. 
 
Legitimacy 
Threat to the 
Group 
Target’s 
Evaluation 
Formal 
Punishment 
Social 
Control 
Collective 
Action 
Negative 
Emotions 
Legitimacy 1 
 
 
    
Threat to the Group .311** 1  
    
Target’s Evaluation -554*** -460*** 1 
    
Formal Punishment .520** .644*** -.461*** 1 
   
Social Control -.212 -.086 .096 -.074 1 
  
Collective Action .222* .545*** -.366** .570*** -.115 1 
 
Negative Emotions .240* .542*** -.343** .446*** -.153 .660*** 1 
 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
Figure 1.Mediated-Moderation model with standardized coefficients. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leader’s Legitimacy 
Formal Punishment Negative Emotions 
Collective Actions 
1.023*** 
.894** 
.537*** Threat to the 
Group 
Social Control 
.289* 
.404** 
-2.343* 
.406* 
.464*** 
